Evidence and Inference by Bird, Alexander
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
King’s Research Portal 
 
DOI:
10.1111/phpr.12311
Document Version
Peer reviewed version
Link to publication record in King's Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Bird, A. (2018). Evidence and Inference. PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH, 96(2), 299-
317. https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12311
Citing this paper
Please note that where the full-text provided on King's Research Portal is the Author Accepted Manuscript or Post-Print version this may
differ from the final Published version. If citing, it is advised that you check and use the publisher's definitive version for pagination,
volume/issue, and date of publication details. And where the final published version is provided on the Research Portal, if citing you are
again advised to check the publisher's website for any subsequent corrections.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the Research Portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognize and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
•Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the Research Portal for the purpose of private study or research.
•You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
•You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the Research Portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact librarypure@kcl.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate your claim.
Download date: 05. Apr. 2019
EVIDENCE AND INFERENCE
Alexander Bird
University of Bristol
Abstract
I articulate a functional characterisation of the concept of evidence, according
to which evidence is that which allows us to make inferences that extend our
knowledge. This entails Williamson’s equation of knowledge with evidence.
1 Introduction
What is evidence? As is well known, Timothy Williamson (1997, 2000) argues that
S’s evidence is precisely what S knows. While we may regard this as a substan-
tive and necessarily true identity claim, akin to ‘water is H2O’, we should note that
Williamson’s argument is an a priori one. If it is a priori that evidence and knowledge
are one and the same, why do we have a concept of evidence at all?
I propose that we answer our initial question by posing another. What is the
purpose of evidence? Whereas knowledge may be intrinsically valuable, we do seek
evidence not for its own sake. Rather we want evidence because evidence will al-
low us to draw conclusions in the course of enquiry. It is evidence that allows us
to infer that a theory is true or to know that a defendant is guilty. So evidence is
sought and is used for the purpose of making inferences. Indeed, most of the philo-
sophical discussion of evidence concerns this feature: above all we ask when will
evidence support an inference to a conclusion; the term ‘evidence’ is most natu-
rally used in the context of a proposition’s being ‘evidence for’ some proposition (or
sometimes ‘evidence against’ and other cognates). The significance of evidence for
the task of inference suggests an answer to our question, why do we have a distinct
concept of evidence: we have a concept of evidence in order to characterise certain
propositions functionally. Put in general terms, the concept of evidence serves to
characterize propositions in terms of their role in inference.
This paper looks at the relationship between evidence and inference in detail in
order to better understand what evidence is. I have two objectives:
(a) To articulate a functional characterisation of the concept of evi-
dence: evidence is that which allows us to make inferences that extend
our knowledge.
(b) To provide an indirect argument for my characterisation by showing
that it entailsWilliamson’s claim that all and only knowledge is evidence,
for which he provides independent argument.
2 The concept of evidence characterised
The characterisation of the concept of evidence I propose is this:
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(EC) p is in S’s evidence if and only S can gain knowledge by inference
from p.
(EC) captures the intuition that evidence is what we infer from in order to get knowl-
edge; it acknowledges an asymmetry between evidence and what evidence is evi-
dence for. Yet the asymmetry afforded by (EC) is local not global. Given some par-
ticular inference, it is the ‘what is inferred from’ that is the evidence. (EC) is consis-
tent with its being the case that the knowledge inferred from evidence itself thereby
becomes evidence, evidence that can be used as the premise of some further infer-
ence.
(EC) is the conjunction of the two implications:
(EC!) ifp is in S’s evidence then S can gain knowledge by inference from
p;
and:
(EC√) if S can gain knowledge by inference from p then p is in S’s evi-
dence.
I shall go on to give reasons why (EC!) and (EC√) provide accurate characteri-
sations of the concept of evidence. But first some clarifications.
In the above pmust play a non-redundant role in the relevant inferences. Take
any knowledge-extending deductive inference: we can include p as a premise in
that argument, and indeed we can construct an argument in which pmight appear
to play a role (e.g. using and-introduction followed by and-elimination). In such
cases p would be redundant, and (EC√) would not license inferring that p is in S’s
evidence. The concept of redundancy also extends to the components of p if p is
complex, e.g. a conjunction: the proposition (r^s) would not be part of one’s evi-
dence just because one can gain knowledge by inference from r.1
We may consider a simple token inference to be composed of three elements:
(i) a set of premises, (ii) an inference procedure, and (iii) a conclusion. Extended
inferences are concatenations of simple inferences. What we may call the epistemic
quality of a subject’s belief in a proposition p concerns whether subject knows p, or
has a justified belief in p that falls short of knowledge, or unjustifiably believes p.
Let us take the case where a subject’s belief in the conclusion comes about solely
as a result of the inference. In that case the epistemic quality of the belief will de-
pend on epistemic characteristics of the premises and of the inference procedure.
The relationship between the epistemic characteristics of the premises and the epis-
temic quality of the conclusionwill be the focus of this essay andwill be discussed at
length. Here I shall consider the epistemic characteristics of the inference procedure
so that we can set it aside.
The epistemic characteristics of the inference procedure will depend on a num-
ber of factors. Consider, for example, a subject carrying out a deductive inference.
The quality of the procedure will depend on formal features of the deduction—e.g.
whether it is valid. It will also depend on factors concerning the subject, e.g. whether
she is intellectually capable of entertaining the premises and conclusion, and that
1I do not think that the notion of redundancy can be formalised. For example one might think that p
is a redundant premise in the set {°[p} in a derivation of q if q can be derived from ° alone (and ° 0 p).
But it might be that any derivation from ° alone is very different from the former (all such proofs might
be much longer). In such a case p would not be redundant in the sense relevant to the above principles,
and should be included amongst S’s evidence for q.
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she does notmake errors in implementing the inference rule. If the inference proce-
dure is non-deductive, its quality will also depend on relevant features of the world.
Let us call an inference procedure faultless iff it it suffers from no shortcomings in
its epistemic characteristics. A simple deductive procedure carried out carefully by
a competent logician will typically be faultless. Likewise, an electrician who infers
from themovement of the needle in a properly functioning ammeter that the battery
to which it is connected is not dead will typically be employing a faultless inference
procedure. A faultless inference procedure will be one that leads from true premises
to true conclusions. If one uses the procedure and reaches a false conclusion from
true premises because of the procedure, then the procedure suffers from an epis-
temic shortcoming. Thismeans that the properties of being faulty andof being fault-
less are strongly externalist epistemic properties: a proceduremight be faulty simply
in virtue of the way the world is: another procedure that is identical as regards the
subject may be faultless. While I do not claim to have characterised ‘faultless’ with
perfect precision, the notion does capture the intuitive idea that when an inference
leads us to a false conclusion, we may sometimes regard the inference procedure,
construed broadly so as to include external features of the world, to be at fault. In
this essay, we shall ignore such possibilities of epistemic fault in the inference pro-
cedure, in order to focus attention on the epistemic quality of the premises in an
inference.
While the epistemic characteristics of the premises and of the inference proce-
dure will be important in determining whether an inference gives the subject new
knowledge, they are not the only relevant factors. S might already know the conclu-
sion to be true, so S cannot gain any knowledge by the inference. Or S might have
strong evidence against q, so that it would be irrational to believe q despite this new
inference. We may regard a subject as receptive if she has no thoughts relevant to q
other than those employed in this inference.
We can now explicate the proposition (C) ‘S can gain knowledge by inference
from p’ as it is used in (EC), (EC!), and (EC√). (C) is true precisely when it is possi-
ble for a receptive subject, S, as a consequence of some faultless inference procedure
from p, a non-redundant premise, to come to know the proposition that is the con-
clusion of the inference.
3 All evidence supports knowledge-producing infer-
ences
In this section I shall provide the argument for:
(EC!) ifp is in S’s evidence then S can gain knowledge by inference from
p.
The idea behind (EC!) is that evidence has a sufficiently high-grade epistemic
quality that a subject is capable of gaining knowledge by inference from it. (EC!)
contrasts with the claim that evidence might be epistemically low-grade and might
be incapable of supporting knowledge-producing inferences. Hence the clarifica-
tion of (EC!) in Section 2 excluded purely accidental reasons why a subject might
fail to produce knowledge from her evidence. A counterexample to (EC!) must
be one where a failure to produce knowledge must be attributable to the epistemic
weakness of the evidence.
Thus (EC!) would be false if either of the following were true:
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(A) A receptive subject S infers q from evidence p by a faultless proce-
dure, but S’s resulting belief, q, is not justified.
(B) A receptive subject S infers q from evidence p by a faultless proce-
dure, but S’s resulting belief, q, is not true.
That (A) is false is clear. It is at the very least the function of evidence to justify
our hypotheses. If a subject uses a faultless inference procedure to gain a new belief
from her evidence, then the new belief is justified.
The falsity of (B), although less immediately apparent, follows straightforwardly
if all evidence is true, since all propositions inferred by a faultless procedure from
true premises will be true, as was discussed above. One might wonder, however,
whether this claim about faultlessness is too strong. Might it not be sufficient for
faultlessness that it justify beliefs, without the additional requirement that the pro-
cedure is perfectly reliable? For example, the inference from ‘Jane has only one ticket
in a ten million ticket fair lottery’ to ‘Jane will not win the lottery’ might be thought
to employ a procedure that is not perfectly reliable but nonetheless justifies its con-
clusion. Should not such a procedure count as faultless in our sense? In the case
where Jane does win the lottery, may not the falsity of the conclusion be regarded as
epistemic bad luck external to the inference as opposed to a result of an epistemic
fault of inference? This is an issue that has beenmuch discussed and cannot settled
here. It is my view (Bird 2004) as well as that of Nelkin (2000), Sutton (2007), et al.
that in lottery cases, a belief (on this evidence) that Jane will not win is not justified.
Such an inference is faulty because its procedure is imperfectly reliable.
So if the evidence propositions are true, a faultless inference procedure will lead
to a true conclusion. But are all evidence propositions true? A central function of
evidence is the testing of hypotheses. In particular it is a requirement on any hy-
pothesis that to be credible it must be consistent with the evidence. Dick Heuer
(1999: 47), an intelligence analyst, states ‘A hypothesis may be disproved . . . by citing
a single item of evidence that is incompatible with it.’ A century and a half earlier,
the legal theorist Thomas Starkie (1834: 444) tells us ‘It is essential that all the facts
should be consistent with the hypothesis. For as all things which have happenedwere
necessarily congruous and consistent, it follows, that if any one established fact be
wholly irreconcilable with the hypothesis, the latter cannot be true. Such an incon-
gruity and inconsistency is sufficient to negative the hypothesis, even although it
coincide and agree with all the other facts and circumstances of the case to themin-
utest extent’ [emphasis as in the original]. Although Starkie uses the term ‘facts’, it is
clear from the context that he is talking about evidence; indeed this passage comes
from a section entitled ‘Circumstantial evidence’ in his book A Practical Treatise on
the Law of Evidence.
That all evidence is true is the best explanation of the requirement on any hy-
pothesis that to be credible it must be consistent with the evidence. If evidence
must be true, then this requirement excludes a set of propositions all of which must
be false. The requirement that hypotheses be consistent with the evidence would
lose its force if false propositions were among our evidence, for then perfectly true
propositions would be excluded as being inconsistent with our evidence.
A response to this argument suggests that the injunction that a hypothesis must
be consistent with the evidence is derived from the prohibition on believing contra-
dictions. If one permitted hypotheses inconsistent with the evidence one would be
permitting contradictions. But this response is inadequate, since the requirement
of consistency with evidence is stronger than the prohibition on contradictions. If
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one is inclined to believe both of two propositions that contradict one another, the
prohibition on contradictions means that one cannot fully believe both. In order to
fully believe either of the propositions, onewill have to reject the other. The prohibi-
tion on contradictions does not say which to reject. It may be that further evidence
is required in order to decide between them. The requirement of consistency with
the evidence is stronger since it does tell us which of the two contradictory propo-
sitions to reject. If a hypothesis and the evidence contradict one another, then the
hypothesis is to be rejected. No further evidence is required. Of course, onemay not
always know what one’s evidence is. In which case one might be in the position of
doubting that one’s evidence is indeed evidence when it conflicts with a favourite,
well-confirmed hypothesis. But it remains that case that if one did know in such a
case that one’s supposed evidence is indeed one’s evidence, then one would be able
to reject the hypothesis as false without further ado. This makes sense only if one’s
evidence is true. If one’s evidence is true, then what is reliably inferred from it is also
true. Hence (B) is false.
(That evidence is true makes it apparent that evidence must be conceived of
in an externalist fashion. I shall return to this in more detail in Section 6. For the
moment I shall reiterate that a strong conception of evidence is forced on us by the
principle ‘reject a hypothesis inconsistent with the evidence’. For example, we do
not accept the principle ‘reject a hypothesis inconsistent with what you believe’—
for it may be appropriate to drop the belief instead. Hence evidence must be more
than mere belief.)
Since (A) and (B) are false, we may conclude that evidence must be capable of
supporting inferences that yield beliefs that are both true and justified. We know
that not all true justified beliefs are knowledge. But it would be very odd if evidence
could support inferences to true justified beliefs but not to knowledge. Further-
more, Gettier cases typically arise because of reliance on justified but false lemmas.
But the falsity of (B) means that we can rule out false lemmas. So there is no rea-
son to suppose that evidence is capable of supporting inferences producing justi-
fied true beliefs without being able to support knowledge-producing inferences. We
may conclude that evidence is indeed capable of supporting knowledge-producing
inferences.
4 Propositions supportingknowledge-producing infer-
ences are evidence
In this section I shall discuss:
(EC√) if S can gain knowledge by inference from p then p is in S’s evi-
dence.
While (EC√) is a natural counterpart of (EC!) neither implies the other. (EC√)
can be true without requiring (EC!). One could deny that evidence must be capa-
ble of supporting knowledge-producing inferences, yet agree that if some inference
does produce knowledge, its premises must be among one’s evidence.
(EC√) asserts the epistemological significance of evidence. If (EC√) were false,
then there are propositions that are not evidence but from which one can nonethe-
less make knowledge-producing inferences. Thus to deny (EC√) would be to deny
the place given to evidence in epistemology. If (EC√) were false, it would be pos-
sible to gain knowledge by inferring from propositions not among our evidence, in
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which case there would be no reason for us to care about which propositions are
among our evidence. A criticism of S’s claim to know qmay be made thus, “Propo-
sition q is not supported by your evidence!”. The falsity of (EC√) would permit S to
reply, “True, q is not supported bymy evidence. But I did infer it from non-evidence
propositions that support knowledge-generating inferences.”
One might reject (EC√) while still giving evidence a key role. This role would be
foundational. An inferred propositionmay be thought of as standing at the near end
of a chain (or tree) of inferences. For the inferred proposition to be known the chain
of inference must start from evidence propositions. But the intermediate proposi-
tions need not count as evidence also (on this view). An adjustment to (EC√) that
encompasses this view would be:
(EC√)0 if S can gain knowledge by inference from p and p is not itself
known by inference then p is in S’s evidence.
According to the view of evidence just considered, inferred propositions cannot
count as evidence, whereas non-inferred propositions, such as propositions known
by direct perception,may so count. It should be noted that on this view, what counts
as evidence may be very vague. The theory-ladenness of perception means that it
will be unclear whether or not a known proposition should count as inferred or not.
For example, it seems as if the fact that a tomato is ripe can be known by direct per-
ception. But for some people, e.g. children, the fact that the difference between ripe
and unripe tomatoes is a marked by a difference in colour is a fact that is learned,
and so their knowledge that the tomato is ripe is inferred. As they become accus-
tomed to making this inference, it passes from a conscious to an unconscious pro-
cess, and until it would be inappropriate to call it an inference at all. So knowledge
that the tomato is ripe will be something that is non-inferential at one stage but is
inferential at a later stage. That some theory of a concept entails that it is vague is no
objection to that theory on its own. But this vagueness does suggest that evidence
could not play a central role in epistemology. Does it make a deep difference that in
one case the proposition that the tomato is ripe is inferred from its perceived red-
ness (and so is not evidence, according to (EC√)0) and in another case its ripeness
is directly perceived (in which case the proposition is evidence)?
More of a problem for (EC√)0 is the fact that evidence propositions can be for-
gotten. Let q be inferred fromaproposition p that is evidence by the lights of (EC√)0.
Then r is inferred from q. We may imagine that all the propositions are known. Let
it be the case that between the first inference and the second inference the subject
forgets the proposition p, so when inferring r she has no longer has any knowledge
of p. According to (EC√)0 she has no evidence for r: her evidence cannot be p, since
she has forgotten p; nor can it be q, since q is inferred and is thus not knowledge.
That seems distinctly odd, since this subject certainly has a good reason for he be-
lief in r (viz. her knowledge of q), and it again undermines the idea that evidence is
epistemically significant. As I (Bird 2004) argue, this and other cases show that the
restriction of evidence to non-inferential beliefs is implausible.2
To sum up the argument for (EC√): evidence is epistemologically significant;
inferences depending on premises that are not part of our evidence are flawed; in
particular they don’t lead to knowledge. If that were wrong, i.e. (EC√) is false, then
it becomes unclear why we care about evidence. If something else other than ev-
idence, call it ‘schmevidence’, could lead to knowledge, then it might be perfectly
2Strictly, I argue against the idea that evidence is restricted to non-inferential knowledge. Those argu-
ments may be extended to the proposal that evidence is a any subset of non-inferred propositions.
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alright to ignore the evidence so long as one had enough schmevidence, since that
could be sufficient for us to expand our knowledge. But we don’t think that. The
rhetorical force of terms such as ‘Evidence-Based Medicine’ and ‘Evidence-Based
Policy’ is precisely that it is absurd to suggest that it is satisfactory to form beliefs on
the basis of anything other than evidence.3 I considered the response that wemight
care about evidence nonetheless, if it is the ultimate source of premises for our in-
ferences, i.e. if evidence is not itself inferred. This proposal ignores the fact that
we generally do not remember the non-inferred propositions from which our in-
ferred knowledge ultimately derives. Nor is that failure to remember to be regarded
as a mere wrinkle, a departure from the ideal depicted by the theory. For our mem-
ories are designed not to store such information. Psychologists distinguish three
types of memory: perceptual memory, short-term memory, and long-term mem-
ory. What we learn non-inferentially, e.g. in perception, will enter the first and often
the second of these kinds of memory (whose duration is short) but only enter the
third if particularly significant. Long-term memory will store information we are
likely to use again, typically information we infer from what we perceive (or from
other knowledge) rather than the perceptual experiences themselves. Given the way
that memory works, evidence could not fulfil its epistemic role if it were restricted
to non-inferential knowledge—we just do not have enough non-inferential knowl-
edge to support, even in an ancestral way, the knowledge-generating inferences we
make. As I shall explain in Section 7, scientists do not use ‘evidence’ to refer only
to non-inferential beliefs or knowledge; for example, proponents of Evidence-Based
Medicine are not asking us to base clinical decisions on what we know through per-
ception but rather on the results of properly conducted randomized trials or meta-
analyses of such studies—such evidence is the outcome of sophisticated statistical
inference, doubly so in the cases of meta-analysis.4
5 Evidence and knowledge
The preceding sections articulated and defended the view, (EC), that p is in S’s ev-
idence if and only S can gain knowledge by inference from p. That completes my
first task, to provide a functional articulation of the concept of knowledge. In the
light of that account, we may ask: what must something be like in order to fulfil
that function? I shall defend the claim that all and only knowledge can fulfil this
function. So we may conclude that all and only knowledge is evidence. That is a
conclusion already reached by Williamson (1997). Since Williamson presented in-
dependent arguments for his conclusion, wemay regard his arguments as providing
indirect support for (EC).
I claim that if (EC!) is true, then evidence itself cannot be less than knowledge:
(E!K) if p is in S’s evidence then S knows p.
The principle ‘No False Lemmas’ states that an inference that depends non-
redundantly on a false premise cannot generate knowledge (Harman 1965: 92). The
principle can be extended. If an inference depends non-redundantly on a premise
3Which is not to say that the claims of, for example, the Evidence-Based Medicine movement are
trivial, because their claims also involve contentious assertions about what counts as good evidence in
medicine.
4A meta-analysis provides a statistical analysis of a set of several first-order studies thereby aiming for
a more robust result than any individual study provides.
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that is unjustified, then the conclusion of the inference will fail to be knowledge.
(This will be so whether justification is conceived of externally, for example in terms
of reliability, or internally, for example in terms of rules of rational belief-formation.)
When an inference depends on several premises non-redundantly, then a subject is
justified in believing the conclusion of the inference only if she is justified in believ-
ing all the premises (assuming that the subject has no other reason for believing the
conclusion). So in addition to the No False Lemmas principle we may state a No
Unjustified Lemmas principle. Consequently, for an inference to generate knowl-
edge, its essential premises must be both true and justified. If the old JTB account
of knowledge were correct, then we could simply infer from the conjunction of the
two principles (No False Lemmas andNoUnjustified Lemmas), a third principle, No
Unknown Lemmas:
(NUL) S can gain knowledge by non-redundant inference from p only if
S knows p.
As it happens a Gettier belief (one that is true and justified, but does not amount
to knowledge) could satisfy No False Lemmas and No Unjustified Lemmas without
satisfying NoUnknown Lemmas. Nonetheless, the best explanation of why No False
Lemmas and No Unjustified Lemmas are correct principles is that they follow from
the more general principle, No Unknown Lemmas. There is nothing special about
true justified beliefs. If p is a Gettier belief, then we should not expect an inference
that depends on p to be knowledge generating. Typically p is a proposition that is
accidentally true, e.g. p = q_r, where q is false but justified but r is true but unjus-
tified. But if p is accidentally true its truth cannot make any difference to the epis-
temic quality of what is inferred from p. But since propositions inferred from false
lemmas are not knowledge, neither then are propositions inferred from accidentally
true propositions. In the kind of Gettier case just mentioned, an inference from p
that yields a justified conclusion will depend essentially on the contribution of the
disjunct q of p (since only the disjunct q is justified). But in that case the inference
depends on a false lemma, and the conclusion is not knowledge. Hence an inference
from a premise which is a Gettier case of a justified true belief that is not knowledge
will not yield knowledge. Nothing short of a known premise will yield knowledge.
(In Section 6 I consider an objection to this claim.)
Having argued for No False Lemmas, (NUL), we now note that this principle plus
(EC!) gives us that all evidence is knowledge, (E!K).
Hence, the left to right implication of (EC), (EC!), entails that all evidence is
knowledge. Correspondingly the right to left implication of (EC), (EC√), entails that
all knowledge is evidence, when conjoined with the highly plausible principle that
inference from knowledge is knowledge generating:
(KI) if S knows p then S can gain knowledge by inference from p;
(EC√) if S can gain knowledge by inference from p then p is in S’s evi-
dence;
therefore
(E√K) if S knows p then p is in S’s evidence.
(KI) is simply the idea that inference from what we already know has the power
to extend our knowledge. The phrase ‘can gain knowledge by inference from p then
p’ is still interpreted as discussed in Section 2, i.e. where the subject is receptive
to p and the inference procedure is faultless; so (KI) is not refuted by cases where
the subject has other beliefs relevant to the conclusion of the inference or where
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the inference is epistemically unsatisfactory. Under the intended interpretation, a
counterexample to (KI), would be a case where S comes to believe q as a result of an
inference from p where S knows p, yet S fails to come to know q because of some
inadequacy in the epistemic quality of p (and not because of some other facts about
S or facts about the inference procedure).
It is difficult to see how (KI) could be false: what more could be required of the
premise of an inference that aims at extending knowledge than that the premise
itself be known? However, the fact that (KI) looks sufficiently similar to the closure
principle for knowledge might make one think that someone such as Nozick (1981)
who rejects closure should reject (KI) as well. Alleged counterexamples to closure
claim that (known) valid inferences from known premises can sometimes lead to
conclusions that cannot be known—for example where the premise is a known
proposition about everyday circumstances (‘S is typing at a computer in a university
office’) and the conclusion is a consequences of that proposition that denies some
relevant sceptical scenario (‘S is not a brain-in-a-vat on a planet orbiting Gamma
Cephei being deceived into believing that she is typing at a computer in a university
office’). Are such cases, if we accept them, counterexamples to (KI)? It is difficult
to say with confidence that they are, precisely because it is difficult to say what
has gone wrong for the subject in such cases. For, prima facie, what could be
epistemically faulty about a valid inference that is furthermore known to be valid?
And the subject in such a case may unproblematically be assumed to be receptive.
That said, I think we can be confident that the fault cannot be laid at the door of
the premise of the subject’s inference. The counterexample posits that S knows that
she is typing as a computer in a university office. Could S’s epistemic relation to
the proposition that S is typing at a computer in a university office be of any higher
quality, such that a higher quality epistemic attitude to that proposition would
permit inferred knowledge that S is not a brain-in-a-vat on a planet orbiting Gamma
Cephei etc.. Clearly not; this is not analogous to the case making an inference from
a premise that is false or unjustified; it is not that the premise is epistemically not
up to the task of supporting a knowledge-generating inference. For that reason, I
believe that a denier of closure must say that in some cases a known valid inference
can be epistemically faulty. The oddity in so saying is just why many find it difficult
to deny closure; but it is at this locus, on the inference procedure, that the debate is
centred. If so, then such counterexamples to closure, even if accepted, need not be
taken as counterexamples to (KI). For example, one might argue, as some epistemic
contextualists do, that closure is a correct principle when restricted to a given
context; what goes wrong in the counterexamples is that there is a cross-context
application of closure; such applications constitute faulty inference procedures. In
any case, the worst damage that a denial of closure could do to my argument is to
require a modification to (KI) and the other principles under discussion. For the
closure denier does regard many inferences as potentially knowledge extending,
and so needs to supply some replacement for closure. Whatever that replacement
is, it will suggest an appropriate replacement for (KI). Mutatis mutandis the argu-
ments of this paper will stand. For example, one modification would be to say that
say that the ‘can gain knowledge’ in all the principles applies only to cases where
the conclusion, when true, is knowable at all to S. The corresponding alteration
to the central claim of this paper would be that the function of evidence is to
provide the premises of inferences that can extend knowledge where knowledge is
possible at all. Likewise, if one prefers a contextualist approach, then the changes
will require restriction to a given context, and the corresponding conclusion will
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give a contextualist account of evidence (which is just what one would expect a
contextualist to endorse). (I note that the argument for (E√K) stands even if we
have to have modify preceding arguments to accommodate the denial of closure. If
we adjust the interpretation of ‘can gain knowledge’ that applies equally to (KI) and
to (EC√), and so (E√K) still follows. If we take a contextualist approach, then the
same contextualist restrictions will apply to what counts as evidence in (E√K) as
applies to what counts as knowledge.)
In this section I have argued that the following are both correct:
(E!K) if p is in S’s evidence then S knows p.
(E√K) if S knows p then p is in S’s evidence.
which together entail:
(E$K) p is in S’s evidence if and only S knows p.
If we combine (KI) with (NUL) we get the following extended ‘knowledge by infer-
ence’ principle:
(KI+) S can gain knowledge by inference from p if and only if S knows p.
Recalling:
(EC) p is in S’s evidence if and only S can gain knowledge by inference
from p.
(KI+) and (EC) directly give us:
(E$K) p is in S’s evidence if and only S knows p.
In summary (where ‘)’ denotes entailment):
(NUL) ^ (EC!) ) (E!K)
^ ^ ^
(KI) ^ (EC√) ) (E√K)
+ + +
(KI+) ^ (EC) ) (E$K)
The fact that (EC), along with the plausible (KI+), entails (E$K) is indirect ev-
idence is favour of (EC). For Timothy Williamson (1997, 2000) has argued persua-
sively for (E$K) on independent grounds. The grounds are independent since
Williamson’s arguments proceed principally on the basis of whether we would re-
gard certain propositions as part of a subject’s evidence, whereas the arguments
above concern principles regarding the function of evidence. In so doing those ar-
guments illuminate the concept of evidence in a way that Williamson’s arguments
do not (and are not intended to). There is no reason to suppose that ‘evidence’ and
‘knowledge’ are the really the same concept. If they were, one might ask, why do
we have a concept of evidence? Why don’t we make do just with the concept of
knowledge? We talk of ‘evidence for’ but not of ‘knowledge for’. We have a con-
cept of evidence distinct from that of knowledge to mark a special role for evidence.
Evidence is characterised functionally as that which supports knowledge-yielding
inferences. (KI+) tells us that it is knowledge that supports knowledge-yielding in-
ferences, which explains why Williamson’s equation is right.
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6 Knowledge inferred from premises that are not
known?
Above I articulated a principle, No Unknown Lemmas, (NUL), which on the face of
it is highly plausible. It has, however, recently come under scrutiny with apparent
counter-examples. (NUL) is close to what Federico Luzzi (2010) calls ‘Knowledge
Counter-Closure’:
(KCC) if (i) S comes to believe q solely on the basis of competent deduc-
tion from p and (ii) S knows q, then S knows p.
(NUL) was an extension of the No False Lemmas principle. Corresponding to the
latter is Truth Counter-Closure:
(TCC) if (i) S comes to believe q solely on the basis of competent deduc-
tion from p and (ii) S knows q, then p is true.
I motivated the extension of No False Lemmas by arguing that one cannot gain
knowledge by non-redundant inference from a premise, if that premise is not jus-
tified. The latter principle, No Unjustified Lemmas, corresponds to Justified Belief
Counter-Closure:
(JBCC) if (i) S comes to believe q solely on the basis of competent de-
duction from p and (ii) S knows q, then S is justified in believing p.
Luzzi (2010: 674–5) provides this case that claims to be a counterexample to
(KCC), and which would also be a counterexample to (NUL):
Agoraphobia Unbeknownst to Ingrid, her new and only housemate
Humphrey is something of an epistemic prankster. One evening, while
Ingrid is in the kitchen cooking dinner, Humphrey mischievously de-
cides to mislead her as to his whereabouts in the house. He there-
fore turns on the TV in the lounge so that she will believe, as she typ-
ically would, that he is in the lounge watching TV. However, also un-
beknownst to her, Humphrey is agoraphobic, and hence would leave
the house under very few circumstances; any circumstance in which
he would leave the house (e.g., because of a raging fire) is undoubtedly
one in which Ingrid would be aware that he is leaving the house. Sup-
pose that Humphrey subsequently momentarily forgets about his ploy
(something quite out of character for him), and accidentally wanders for
a few seconds back into the lounge. During that interval, Ingrid forms
the belief that Humphrey is in the lounge on the basis of hearing the TV
on by relying (whether implicitly or explicitly) on this inductive argu-
ment: ‘(A) The TV is on and I didn’t turn it on. (B) When this happens,
Humphrey is almost always in the lounge. So (1) Humphrey is in the
lounge’. She then carries out the following valid and sound deduction:
1. Humphrey is in the lounge.
2. If Humphrey is in the lounge, then Humphrey is in the
house.
Therefore,
3. Humphrey is in the house.
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Suppose, too, that Ingrid believes (3) via no other epistemic route.
Luzzi claims that Ingrid knows that Humphrey is in the house. However, she does
not know that he is in the lounge. So she has knowledge thanks to a deduction from
a premise she does not know to be true. So (KCC) is false and so is (NUL).
Why is it that Ingrid knows that Humphrey is in the house? Luzzi argues primar-
ily on the basis that we have a strong intuition here that Ingrid knows. But he also
points out that none of the normal reasons that preclude beliefs from being knowl-
edge apply here, including the reasons we find for articulating why Gettier cases are
not cases of knowledge. In particular, Ingrid’s belief satisfies sensitivity—the nearest
possible world inwhich it is false that Humphrey is in the house (e.g. there is a fire) is
one in which she does not believe that he is in the house. And it satisfies safety—her
belief is true in all nearby possible worlds.
The fact that Humphrey is agoraphobic and that this is not known to Ingrid is
important. If Ingrid knew that Humphrey were agoraphobic, that knowledge would
provide an alternative route for Ingrid to reach the conclusion, and we could not
be sure that reflecting on this does not influence the intuition that she knows that
Humphrey is in the house. That Humphrey is agoraphobic is what makes Ingrid’s
belief that Humphrey is in the house satisfy the externalist considerations of sensi-
tivity and safety. For if he were not agoraphobic then there would be nearby worlds
in which he leaves the house, and in particular nearby worlds where he leaves the
house and in which she continues to believe that he is in the house.
As I shall now show, we are able to construct numerous cases that involve a single
premise deduction with premise p and conclusion q, where the subject believes q
(only) because of the deduction from p, the belief in q satisfies safety and sensitivity,
but the belief in p does not. Such cases ought to be good candidates as additional
counterexamples to (KCC) if Luzzi is right in his diagnosis of Agoraphobia.
Since q is true in all the worlds where p is true, qwill be at least as safe as p. Con-
sequently, for an unsafe proposition one ought to be able to find a safe proposition
q that is deducible from p. Here are one case:
Complex tautology p is an unsafe proposition. S works out by the truth
table method that (p! q) is a tautology. In fact this is because q is itself
a tautology, but this fact is not apparent to S. S believes q because q is
deduced from p.
In this case p is unsafe and so unknown. But q is safe—it is a tautology. Here is a case
with a contingent proposition in place of q:
Spurious precision Theory T predicts that the value of parameter ≤ is
8.1£10°12F/m. S measures the value of ≤ using a very reliable piece
of equipment, and gets the result ≤= 8.85419£10°12F/m. So S believes
that ≤= 8.85419£10°12F/m and deduces that T is false. It happens that
by chance the belief is true—although the equipment is reliable it is not
nearly as precise as the readout suggests; S is unaware that its limit of
precision is five significant digits.
S’s belief concerning the value of ≤ is unsafe. But the proposition deduced from this,
that T is false, may be a safe proposition.
That there can be pairs of such propositions playing the role of p and q in the
above seems clear. As a result it is very tempting to think that there ought to be cases
where p is not known, just because it is unsafe, and where q, being safe, is known.
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Now consider sensitivity. Where q is deducible from p, trivial cases excepted, q
will tend to be more sensitive than p. As above q will be true in a superset of the
possible worlds in which p is true, and so the closest possible world where p is false
will be closer than the closest possible world where q is true. By taking us to a more
distant possible world, the falsity of q is more likely to generate a world in which S’s
beliefs are different from those in the actual world. Consequently, it seems plausible
that there are many pairs of propositions p and q such that q is deducible from p
where p fails to be known on grounds of failing to satisfy the sensitivity requirement,
butwhere q does satisfy the sensitivity requirement and so succeeds in being known.
In the case of Complex tautology, belief in p might not satisfy sensitivity, whereas
belief in q does so trivially. In Spurious precision, it is a fluke that the equipment
gives the correct answer to this degree of precision; it would have given the same
result had the value of ≤ been slightly different, e.g. 8.85418£10°12F/m. So S’s belief
that ≤ = 8.85419£10°12F/m fails sensitivity. But the world might have been very
different had T been false, and so S’s belief in T would satisfy sensitivity.
Consequently, we can indeed construct cases were the belief in the premise of
a deduction does not satisfy safety and sensitivity but belief in the conclusion does
satisfy those conditions. It is tempting to think that such cases constitute counterex-
amples to (KCC) and (NUL). Nonetheless, I am not sure that we should yield to the
temptation to accept the plausibility of the forgoing reasoning. While it is true for
the above conditions that it is possible to find cases where p deductively entails q
and p fails the conditions and q satisfies it, it does not follow from this that there
are cases where p fails to be known for just that reason, and thus q succeeds in be-
ing known. That line of thought seems to rely upon the idea that knowledge is a
matter of meeting certain conditions, and that once all the conditions are met, the
proposition is known. But this just the view that is denied by Williamson.
It should be noted how easy it is to satisfy the conditions of sensitivity and safety.
The simpler versions of the safety principle make necessary truths trivially safe;
they also trivially satisfy sensitivity (some versions of sensitivity just decline to cover
truths that are in any way necessary). For the reasons given above, it is possible to
find non-trivial (but almost trivial) examples with contingent propositions. Con-
sider propositions such as “the Earth is more than 10,000 years old” or “atoms are
composed of electrons, protons, and neutrons”. Such propositions, being deeply
tied to the history of the world or the laws of nature, look to be true in all the clos-
est possible worlds. In particular, were those propositions false we human believers
wouldn’t exist. So there are noworlds inwhich I falsely believe either of those propo-
sitions.
Furthermore, although those conditions are used to avoid some Gettier cases,
I don’t think that they can avoid all. For if the propositions above satisfy the safety
and sensitivity conditions then their disjunctionwith some false but justified propo-
sition will also satisfy the conditions. Consider a late seventeenth century follower
of Newton who believes ‘F=ma or the Earth is more than 10,000 years old’. He be-
lieves this only because he believes the first disjunct, which is justified, but strictly
false for relativistic reasons. He doesn’t believe the second disjunct. His overall be-
lief is a true justified belief, but which is not knowledge. So it is a Gettier case. But is
also happens to satisfy sensitivity and safety.
Note that there are more subtle variants on this. Consider the following: ‘F=ma
or Isaac Newton senior is the father of Sir Isaac Newton.’ Now imagine that this is
believed by some late seventeenth century follower of Newton just because they be-
lieve the first disjunct. In fact because of the some spurious scandal theymistakenly
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deny the second disjunct. Consider the nearest possible world in which the propo-
sition is true. That is one in which Isaac Newton senior does not have a son who
becomes the famous mathematician, Sir Isaac Newton. In that world Sir Isaac New-
ton does not exist. But we may suppose that in this world it was sometime after the
end of the seventeenth century that anyone proposed that ‘F=ma’. And so our sub-
ject, does not believe F=ma. Hence, the disjunctive proposition satisfies sensitivity,
and also safety.
Now we can return to Luzzi’s case. Luzzi suggests that if we deny that Ingrid
knows that Humphrey is in the house, then we are left with a new kind of Gettier
example. It is a new kind of Gettier because none of the normal diagnoses apply,
including sensitivity and safety. But as the above shows, some cases following an
entirely familiar pattern of Gettier cases—ones formed by disjoining a false but justi-
fied belief with a true but unjustified belief—cannot be diagnosed as violating those
requirements.
Luzzi does also mention that Agoraphobia does not suffer from the No False
Lemmas diagnosis of the failure of Gettier cases to be knowledge (while my New-
ton cases do suffer from that analysis). Nonetheless, Agoraphobia is very close to be
a case where the No False Lemmas principle does rule out knowledge. Imagine that
we retell the story slightly differently, so that Ingrid’s initial belief is “Humphrey is
watching the television” from which she infers that he is in the house. But, contin-
uing the story just as Luzzi does, Humphrey wanders back in to the lounge but not
to watch the television. In this case Ingrid’s inference will have started from a false
belief. But it seems implausible that whether Ingrid knows should depend on which
of these two propositions she believes at the beginning “Humphrey is in the lounge”
or “Humphrey is watching the television”. Both bear the same cognitive relation-
ship to Ingrid—she believes them for the same reason (the sound of the TV) and
they can both play the same role in her inference to the conclusion that Humphrey
is in the house. If she starts with ‘Humphrey is watching the television” I think it is
intuitively clear that she does not know the conclusion of her inference; hence she
does not know if instead she starts with “Humphrey is in the lounge”. It seems a
plausible principle that if a belief fails to be knowledge because it fails the No False
Lemmas condition, then it cannot be transformed into knowledge by replacing the
false lemma by one that is true but only accidentally so (i.e. a true lemma that bears
a very similar cognitive relationship to the subject). As I have argued above, the
most coherent way of articulating the thought that if one makes an inference with
false premises or accidentally true ones, then the conclusion cannot be knowledge,
is the fact that in each case the premise fails to be knowledge. It may be claimed that
what I am doing here is wielding my principle (NUL) in order to re-interpret a po-
tential counterexample to (NUL) and that I am therefore begging the question. That
isn’t quite what I intend. Rather I suggest that insofar as Luzzi is appealing to intu-
itions to assert that Ingrid knows, we can also elicit intuitions going in the opposite
direction, that deny that Ingrid knows. While these intuitions are best explained by
(NUL), that fact is not supposed to be part of they probative force of the intuitions.
Consequently my conclusion is that the intuitions in favour of Luzzi’s reading are
not sufficiently robust to refute (NUL).
Some authors (Hilpinen 1988; Warfield 2005; Arnold 2011) claim to find cases
where knowledge can be gained by inferences from false propositions, thereby ap-
pearing to refute No False Lemmas also. Consider a case like Spurious precision
where the precise belief is false. Hilpinen argues that such a case is one where we
can gain knowledge by inference from a falsehood but notes also that in such cases
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the false proposition is close to the truth. Plausibly therefore there is a nearby true
proposition that the subject also believes or is disposed to believe and this can be
made to do the epistemic work of supporting a knowledge-producing inference (cf.
Coffman 2008). Warfield criticises this strategy for defending the requirement of
truth. The best versions of the strategy that Warfield considers are:
(S1) S has knowledge despite inferring from a falsehood if there is a jus-
tified and (at least) dispositionally believed truth entailed by the false-
hood that serves as the premise in the inference.
(S2) S has knowledge despite inferring from a falsehood if there is a jus-
tified and (at least) dispositionally believed truth evidentially supported
by the evidence for the involved falsehood.
Warfield points out that these strategies are defeated by the fact that they yield the
wrong answer in standard Gettier cases. I seem to see that there is a dog in the yard
(in fact it is only a toy) and infer that there is an animal in the yard. Unseen there
is a squirrel in the yard. In both cases the proposition ‘there is a dog or a squirrel in
the yard’ serves as the relevant justified and (at least) dispositionally believed truth,
and so both yield the conclusion that S knows, whereas this is a clear case of Gettier
non-knowledge.
The two strategies are bound to fail because they require the relevant proposi-
tion only to be true and justified, inviting us to chose a Gettier-style proposition;
propositions inferred from such propositions will not themselves be known. A nat-
ural requirement on the ‘replacement’ for the false proposition is one that is itself
known. The idea, a further strengthening of the approach of Coffman and Hilpinen,
is that where an apparent inference uses a premise that is false, the inferred proposi-
tionmay still be knowledge if in the neighbourhood of the false proposition is a true
proposition that the subject knows, which the subject comes to know by a mecha-
nism similar to that by which the false proposition is believed, and which can sub-
stitute for the false proposition in an inference very similar to the one in question.
For short:
(SK) S has knowledge despite inferring from a falsehood if there is a cog-
nitively similar process leading to the same conclusion starting from a
proposition that S knows.
(SK) escapes Warfield’s Gettier response. It addresses cases like Spurious preci-
sion. When S looks at the equipment and sees the display say that ≤ has the value
8.85419£10°12F/m, S believes, but does not know, that ≤ = 8.85419£10°12F/m; S
also believes, and does know, that ≤ is greater than 8.8£10°12F/m. In the kind of
case we are considering, S does not infer the second from the first; rather both be-
liefs comes about as a direct result of seeing the display. From both beliefs S can
infer, in the same way, that the theory under test, T, is false.
One objection to this approach (and indeed to other approaches of the same
kind) is that it doesn’t really explain what needs explaining. Wewere wondering how
an inference from a false (or true but not known) proposition can lead to knowledge.
How does it help us understand this to show that a the subject could have engaged
in a different inference starting from a different premise? Furthermore, does not
this strategy just amount to admitting that there are counterexamples to (KCC) and
(NUL)?
This objection assumes a misleading conception of the cognitive psychology of
inference that is a consequence of the way that philosophers represent inferences.
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We represent inferences as sequences of precise propositions related by precise in-
ference rules—which for many purposes is a useful and revealing thing to do. If that
were also a correct representation of the cognitive psychology of inference, then it
would be correct to say that S actually made this inference but didn’t in fact make
this very similar inference. Yet, the psychology of inference is a much coarser, less
precise matter. I pick up a PhD thesis in order to judge how long it will take me
to read it; I conclude that it will take me more than two days. Which propositions
formed the basis of this inference? That the thesis clearly hasmanymore than 50,000
words? That it probably hasmore than 70,000 words? That it looks longer thanmost
theses I have read? It does not appear correct to say that it is this one of these propo-
sitions, but not the others, that I used in my inference. More plausibly I make all
of these judgments and all play some role in influencing my conclusion. I conjec-
ture that, recognising this, we understand that although some inferences may be
represented in a precise way as starting from a proposition that is not known, this
is misleading, especially in the case of inferences starting from beliefs acquired by
perception. We understand in such cases that the psychological reality is that there
are other propositions that we do know and that are also involved in the cognitive
process of inference and that the presence and role of these can suffice to lead to
knowledge of the inferred proposition (or propositions). Of course, such a picture
means that there will be considerable vagueness about when an inference process
really does involved known premises in the right way. But that seems to be no more
vagueness than we actually encounter in such cases, and may explain why cases
such as Luzzi’s are contentious.
7 Evidence and science
The conception of evidence advanced by (EC) tells us that to achieve the status of
evidence a propositionmust be capable of supporting inferences that deliver knowl-
edge; furthermore any proposition that is so capable counts as among the subject’s
evidence. The latter tells us that evidential propositions are not restricted by con-
tent nor by the means by which they come to be believed. The proposal thus rejects
a conception of evidence thatmight appeal to certain empiricists, whereby evidence
propositions must concern what a subject perceives or observes. I mentioned and
rejected another conception of evidence that would appeal to some empiricists (and
perhaps some non-empiricist foundationalists), viz. that evidence is restricted to
propositions that are not themselves inferred from other propositions. Instead any
proposition, including propositions that may have been inferred from other propo-
sitions and including propositions thatmay be quite removed fromperception, may
serve as an evidence proposition so long as it is capable of supporting knowledge-
generating inferences. In the light of (KI+), we see that the propositions that fulfil
this role are precisely the propositions that constitute the subject’s knowledge.
It is worth noting that the use of ‘evidence’ in science accords with the concep-
tion promoted here rather better than with the empiricist view(s) of evidence. Part
of the evidence for Einstein’s general theory of relativity is the anomalous precession
of the perihelion ofMercury. The precession is inferred frommany individual obser-
vations of Mercury and that inference involves considerable mathematical work as
well as substantive auxiliary hypotheses. Secondly, the precession is not perceptible.
So this standard use of ‘evidence’ in science does not accord with an empiricist view,
but does with the inferentialist conception.
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It is nonetheless true that the precession of Mercury is often referred to by sci-
entists as an ‘observation’. This shows only that the scientists’ conception of obser-
vation is one that is only remotely linked to perception. Historically, observation
has typically been heavily perceptual, but even then it has rarely been exclusively
perceptual. An astronomical observation may involve looking at a planet through a
telescope, but the key information in the recorded observation will include the ele-
vation of the telescope, its geographical location, and the time at which the planet
was seen, which are not perceived through the telescope, and in the case of time,
not perceptible at all (even if one has a watch). Likewise observations by nineteenth
century chemists and physicists recorded values of variables such as temperature
and electric current, which cannot be perceived. Positivists may argue that the real
observations are perceptions of the instruments. Even so, it remains true that the
use of even perceptual reports needs to be given context, which is not obviously per-
ceptual: is what did the observer did to to avoid a parallax error something that is
itself perceptible by her? The empiricist proposal to limit ‘observation’ to perceptual
encounters is a revision to our use of the term ‘observation’. Observation in modern
science is even less perceptual andmore heavily theory-laden. The Higgs boson has
been observed, but no one has perceived it; nor indeed has anyone seen its trail on
a cloud chamber photograph. Rather a vast array of different kinds of detectors, all
designed in a theory-intensive way, are connected to a computer which delivered its
results in a statistical form. In less esoteric science, modern radio telescopy delivers
nothing of significance that is perceptible, but rather the evidence is in the form of
data collected in a computer, which, furthermore, has been processed by statisti-
cal software. The same goes for the evidence that is used in constructing weather
models, which is collected and processed automatically.
Furthermore, if the evidence is strong enough for the physicists to conclude that
the Higgs exists, then its existence become a fact that itself is evidence that can be
used as required, for example in confirming the standard model of particle physics.
This illustrates the import of (E√K) and of (EC√). Whatmakes something evidence
is not that it was produced in some specific way, but rather that it can be used for
a certain purpose: making knowledge-producing inferences. Correspondingly what
scientists care about when they consider whether a proposition (such as an asser-
tion that the precession of the perihelion of Mercury is 5557 seconds of arc per cen-
tury, or that the Higgs boson exists) counts as evidence is not what general kind of
source (perception, observation, inference form theory) produced the proposition,
but whether the particular process that produced it warrants that proposition suf-
ficiently that it can be relied upon in making further inferences. I have argued that
such warrant is sufficient if and only if it is enough to make the proposition in ques-
tion known.
8 Conclusion
At the outset I gavemyself two objectives: (a) to articulate a functional characterisa-
tion of the concept of evidence that relates to inference; (b) to relate my characteri-
sation to Timothy Williamson’s claim that all and only knowledge is evidence.
The guiding idea behind (a) is that evidence is something we want for a purpose.
We don’t collect evidence for its own sake, but in order to make inferences from it
(e.g. concerning the truth of a hypothesis). Of course we can make inferences from
any old propositions and beliefs. But not just any old proposition or belief is ev-
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idence. We want evidence for epistemically worthwhile inferences, the ones that
produce knowledge: evidence is that from which knowledge-producing inferences
can be made.
This conception allows any proposition to be evidence, so long as one can in-
fer knowledge from it. This stands in contrast to a conception of evidence as that
from which inference ultimately starts: evidence must be non-inferential. The in-
adequacies of this view of evidence were exposed by considering the possibilities of
forgetting one’s evidence or having it undermined by further evidence.
The conception of evidence as that which supports knowledge-producing infer-
ences entails that all and only knowledge is evidence. This equation of knowledge
and evidence is the conclusion reached byWilliamson. My account and his are mu-
tually supporting: mine provides an account of the concept of evidence, his provides
a substantive identity concerning evidence. The idea that belief aims at knowledge
is implicit inWilliamson’s epistemology (but not explicitly argued for). The initial in-
tuition I employed concerning evidence is that we want evidence for a purpose: to
make inferences from that evidence, inferences whose conclusions we can believe.
Therefore, if belief aims at knowledge, then what we want from evidence is that it
will permit knowledge-producing inferences.
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